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Foreword
ountry Economic Memorandum (CEM) is a regular eco-
nomic survey carried out by the World Bank in every
member country. The authors of the survey are usually World
Bank experts who conduct an in-depth study of the state of
the country. After they hand the draft survey to the govern-
ment and government officials give their comments on it, the
document is considered an agreed program for economic
development that defines a plan of concrete government
measures. In reality, however, this strategy of the programs
preparation has never resulted in adoption of the CEM as the
Governments action plan.
The last Country Economic Memorandum that the World
Bank prepared for Ukraine dates from 1993. In 1997, the
World Bank chose to co-operate with the International Centre
for Policy Studies (ICPS) in preparation of the new Country
Economic Memorandum. ICPS proposed to involve Ukrain-
ian experts from the government in the process, which was a
sweeping change in the World Banks methodology. The im-
plementation of this project has been carefully watched over
by the Washington office.
The outcome of productive dialogue between the Ukrainian
Government and the World Bank is a draft Country Economic
Memorandum, which is compiled in three volumes.
The first volume identifies and evaluates alternative economic
strategies for Ukraine (the preservation strategy, protectionist
strategy, and competitiveness strategy).
The second volume presents the World Banks recommenda-
tions for the Ukrainian Government to adopt the most prom-
ising and challenging variant, which is the competitiveness
strategy. Volume 2 is the CEMs main document.
The third volume contains reports prepared by Ukrainian gov-
ernment experts on the following topics: (1) fiscal policy; (2)
education; (3) health; (4) social security policy; (5) industrial
and trade policy; (6) agrarian policy, (7) energy policy, and
(8) shadow economy.
This issue of POLICY STUDIES presents the first volume, Eco-
nomic Growth with Equity: Which Strategy for Ukraine? This broad
document allows the reader to understand the challenges fac-
ing Ukraine. This work is the result of collaborative efforts by
C
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the World Bank and Ukrainian researchers. The study was led
by:
· John HANSEN, Economic Advisor, World Bank Resident
Mission.
· Vira NANIVSKA, Director of International Centre for Pol-
icy Studies.
· Ihor SHUMYLO, Deputy Minister of Economy of Ukraine.
Diana COOK, a RAND consultant, made valuable contribu-
tions to this volume.
We encourage the readers of POLICY STUDIES to discuss the
document. Comments may be sent to Sergiy LOBOYKO, Co-
ordinator of Country Economic Memorandum project, ICPS.
Our address: 8/5 Voloska St., 254070 Kyiv, Ukraine
Telephone: + 38044 4635974
Fax: +38044 4635970
E-mail: sloboyko@icps.kiev.ua
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Executive Summary
kraines economy has been slipping backwards for
nearly nine years, resulting in a significant fall in living
standards for the Ukrainian people. Putting the country back
on the path to prosperity requires policy makers to stop let-
ting economic crises dictate the policy agenda. Short-term
problems need to be dealt with in the context of a longer-term
strategy focused on improving the living standards of Ukrain-
ian people, including the most vulnerable in society.
What strategy should Ukraine follow? This report identifies
and evaluates three different alternatives for Ukraine:
· THE PRESERVATION STRATEGY involves only a slow
movement towards a market economy. Under this strat-
egy, Government maintains existing structures of owner-
ship and control and seeks to preserve the social benefits
of the Soviet regime. Retaining subsidies to enterprises
avoids the sharp drop in production and employment
that would result from their removal. However, long term
growth prospects are damaged by the continued support
of inefficient production and the cost of financing high
government spending.
· THE PROTECTIONIST STRATEGY involves shielding se-
lected domestic industries from competition from exter-
nal and other domestic producers. If Government is suc-
cessful at picking winners, limited protectionism may
help develop new industries and deliver economic
growth. However, as shown by unfortunate experience
around the world, the information constraints on policy
makers create a significant risk that resources will be
channelled into inefficient industries. This ultimately
undermines economic growth.
· THE COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY implies a much smaller
role for Government than the preservation or protection-
ist strategies. Under this approach, the Government aims
to create an environment that encourages competition
and gives all producers an equal chance to succeed. A key
benefit of this strategy is that resources are more likely to
be directed towards producing those goods and services
that Ukraine is best at. This increases the purchasing
power of Ukrainian consumers and enhances Ukraines
prospects in export markets. The most significant cost of
adopting this strategy would be faced by those workers in
U
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enterprises that are unable to stay afloat in the new com-
petitive environment.
This report recommends that the Ukrainian Government
adopt the competitiveness strategy. To implement this strat-
egy, Government would have to take a conscious decision to
accept some short-term costs in return for placing Ukraine on
a path towards higher living standards. However, by acknowl-
edging these costs, Government can develop a plan to mini-
mise their impact. To deal with the countrys inter-related
economic and social problems effectively, Ukraine must re-
focus decision-making processes away from the short term
and towards a more strategic model of government.
Economic Growth with Equity: Which Strategy for Ukraine?
Policy Studies, March 1999 7
1. The Need for an Economic
Strategy
Ukraines economy has been slipping backwards for nearly a decade, resulting in
a significant fall in the living standards of the Ukrainian people. Putting
Ukraine back on the path to prosperity will require policy makers to stop letting
economic crises dictate the policy agenda. Short-term problems need to be dealt
with in the context of a longer-term strategy.
1.1 Dealing with Depression
Ukraine is a country of great potential. It is blessed with well-
educated people, abundant natural resources and a tradition
of hard work in industry and agriculture. Its geographical lo-
cation in the heart of Europe leaves Ukraine in a good posi-
tion to benefit from world trade. At independence, Ukraine
was widely considered to have excellent prospects.
Instead Ukraine has endured one of the worlds worst depres-
sions in modern history. That depression has lasted for nearly
9 years and has reduced gross domestic product (GDP) by
over 60%. Even among the countries of the former Soviet Un-
ion, Ukraine stands out as having one of the deepest and
longest periods of economic decline.
Cumulative Economic Decline for FSU: 1989-96
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Ukraine is a country of
great potential. But it has
endured one of the
worlds worst depressions
in modern history. The
impact of declines in
GDP on the people of
Ukraine has been acute.
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Although the economy seemed to have stabilised by mid-
1998, the crises of Asia and Russia now threaten this hard-won
stability. With limited signs of real growth for the economy as
a whole, the hard-won stability now looks more like stagna-
tion.
The impact of declines in GDP on the people of Ukraine has
been acute. They must now live on less than half the income
they enjoyed a few short years ago. At least 30%, and perhaps
up to 75%, of families now live below the poverty line, up
sharply from the time of independence.1 Their savings ac-
counts were wiped out by the hyperinflation of 1992-93. Sick-
ness from preventable causes is rising, death rates are climb-
ing, life expectancy is falling, and the population is shrinking.
Although the collapse in industrial production has somewhat
reduced environmental pollution, the levels still far exceed
the standards of countries not suffering from the environ-
mental neglect of the Soviet past. In addition, the people of
Ukraine still must deal with the aftermath of the Chernobyl
disaster.
1.2 Economic Policy Without Vision
Why has Ukraine not been able to take advantage of its great
potential? The problem is that Ukraine has become bogged
down in fire-fighting and has lost sight of its overall objec-
tives. While the President and Government have articulated a
general medium term direction for economic policy, policy
implementation bears little resemblance to that vision. As a
result, Ukraine has stumbled from one crisis to another. The
recent economic history of Ukraine illustrates this problem.
The initial years after independence were characterised by
large budget deficits as the Government struggled to support
declining enterprises and industries. These deficits were fi-
nanced largely by borrowing from the central bank and the
resulting hyperinflation contributed to the uncertainty facing
potential investors.
In the middle of 1994, recognising the costs of inflation, the
Government began to rely less on the National Bank to fi-
nance its deficits and the majority of the deficit was financed
through borrowing. It also made a major effort to reduce the
budget deficit, which fell to just over 4% by 1996. Inflation
                                                                
1 See: Ukraine: Restoring Growth with Equity  Country Economic
Memorandum.
Ukraine has become
bogged down in fire-
fighting and has lost
sight of its overall objec-
tives. As a result,
Ukraine has stumbled
from one crisis to another.
This experience highlights
the dangers of not ad-
dressing economic prob-
lems in the context of a
wider economic strategy.
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dropped from the hyperinflationary levels of 1992 and 1993
to a modest 10% in 1997. The nominal exchange rate, which
had devalued by over 400 times between the third quarter of
1992 and December 1994, has been more or less stable since
mid-1995.
Consolidated Budget Balance
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However, the Government was so overwhelmed by the need
to stabilise the economy, it seemed unable to step back and
address the underlying problems. A more fundamental prob-
lem was that Ukraines ability to produce goods and services
had fallen since the collapse of the Soviet economy. The
weakness in the economic outlook reflects a fall in productive
capacity, and a continuing decline in GDP during 1998 was
matched by a resurgence in inflation. The combination of
falling GDP and rising prices suggests that Ukrainian enter-
prises are not able to produce the goods and services that
Ukrainians and foreigners want to buy.
There are a number of explanations for this fall in Ukraines
productive capacity. With the collapse of the Soviet Union,
increases in energy prices raised the cost of doing business
especially in the highly energy intensive Ukrainian economy.
The move to world prices worsened Ukraines terms of trade
with Russia, its main supplier of raw materials. Perhaps most
importantly, the economy had been caught between a
planned and a market economy without a clear economic sys-
tem for allocating resources. This has been reflected in the
Economic Growth with Equity: Which Strategy for Ukraine?
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continued growth of indirect subsidies, such as tax exemp-
tions, the shadow economy and arrears.
As a result, financial stability did not bring economic growth.
These problems continued to undermine economic activity,
despite the governments fiscal reforms, putting renewed up-
ward pressure on spending and shrinking the governments
tax base. The deficit shot up to almost 7% of GDP in 1997.
The combination of tight monetary policy and growing fiscal
deficits lead Ukraine into a classic debt trap. With inflation
running at about 10%, real interest rates were exceeding 60%
by late 1998 (see Figure 3). As a result, the 1998 crisis in Rus-
sia caught Ukraine in a vulnerable position.
Ukraine: T-Bills
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Ukraines recent experience highlights the dangers of not
addressing economic problems in the context of a wider eco-
nomic strategy. Expenditure cuts to reduce the deficit were
not sustainable without policies to change the role of gov-
ernment in the economy, to reduce structural inefficiencies,
to move shadow activity into the formal economy and to im-
prove the productive capacity of Ukraine. Therefore, this re-
port seeks to identify a strategy for putting Ukraine back on
the road to economic prosperity. It begins by clarifying the
objectives of economic policy (chapter 2), then evaluates al-
ternative strategies for achieving those objectives (chapters 3-
7) and, based on this analysis, develops a recommended strat-
egy (chapter 8).
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2. Economic Growth with Equity
Before developing a strategy for economic and social policy, Ukraine needs a
clear idea of what it wants to achieve. Alternative strategies need to be
evaluated in terms of their success at getting Ukraine where it wants to be. What
does Ukraine want to achieve? The ultimate objective of public policy is to raise
the living standards of the Ukrainian people. Policy makers are concerned with
the overall economic welfare of Ukrainians and in how that welfare is
distributed amongst the population.
2.1 Economic Growth
It is important to keep in mind when designing economic
policy that living standards are our ultimate objective. There-
fore, the subsequent chapters evaluate alternative economic
strategies in terms of the impact on Ukrainian living stan-
dards, both in the immediate and more distance future.
Sometimes policy makers will face trade-offs between main-
taining economic activity in the short term and setting the
background for sustainable economic growth. While short
term consequences are important, they should not be the sole
drivers of economic policy.
The level of real GDP is a good gauge of economic prosperity,
and growth in real GDP is a good gauge of economic prog-
ress. In particular, for policy makers concerned about living
standards, GDP per person is an important measure of eco-
nomic well being. It tells us about the quantity of goods and
services available for the typical person in the economy.
While policy makers are ultimately concerned about living
standards, they often worry about other economic variables
like the public deficit, inflation, the current account balance,
and employment. These indicators are important measures of
the sustainability of economic growth and improvements in
living standards. In particular:
· International experience has indicated that very high
levels of inflation are generally harmful to economic
growth. In particular, high levels of inflation can dis-
courage savings and investment. Some countries manage
to attain quite respectable rates of growth despite infla-
tion. In fact, up to about 25% per year, there is little cor-
relation between inflation and economic growth. How-
ever, beyond this level growth generally drops off
quickly.
It is important to keep in
mind when designing
economic policy that liv-
ing standards are our
ultimate objective. The
level of real GDP is a
good gauge of economic
prosperity. Public deficits,
inflation, the current
account balance, and
employment are impor-
tant measures of the sus-
tainability of economic
growth and improve-
ments in living stan-
dards.
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Annual Inflation and Per Capita Growth Rates,
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· A large current account deficit means that a country is
spending more than it is earning. The gap between the
two is financed by foreign lending and investing. But we
can not continue to spend more than we earn forever. As
the current account deficit gets bigger, foreign lenders
and investors become increasingly nervous about the abil-
ity of a country to repay them and about the stability of
the exchange rate. They impose high interest rates to
compensate them for this risk. In the extreme case, inves-
tors may actually flee the country, pushing the value of
the domestic currency down and interest rates up. High
interest rates stifle economic growth by discouraging con-
sumption and investment. Over time, exports recover and
imports ease, bringing the current account back into bal-
ance.
· Persistent fiscal deficits can also be a constraint to eco-
nomic activity. By reducing national savings, budget defi-
cits translate into increases in real interest rates and falls
in investment. Reduced investment leads over time to a
smaller stock of capital, reducing the ability of the econ-
omy to produce goods and services. In addition, the build
up of debt must eventually be repaid implying an increase
in future tax rates or a cut in future government spend-
Economic Growth with Equity: Which Strategy for Ukraine?
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ing. Either way, inheriting a large government debt lower
is the living standards of future generations.
· Access to employment or paid work is an important de-
terminant of the welfare of Ukrainian people. In addi-
tion, people are an important resource. If a growing
number are not utilised, this is a significant constraint on
Ukraines ability to grow.
We are not interested in these variables for their own sake but
because of their impact on economic activity or standards of
living. Predicting the consequences of alternative economic
strategies for these variables can help assess whether the strat-
egy can deliver sustainable economic growth.
2.2 Equity Not Equality
Of course policy makers are not only concerned about the size
of the pie but also about how that pie is distributed. In this
case, we are likely to be concerned about the level of em-
ployment, or unemployment, for its own sake. Employment
provides a link between economic growth and equity objec-
tives. Improved employment opportunities is one of the key
ways that the benefits of economic growth are delivered to the
average Ukrainian person. If our economic strategy delivers
robust economic growth but high levels of unemployment,
large numbers of Ukrainians would not be sharing in the
economic success.
Evaluating the equity of a strategy is more difficult than
evaluating its impact on economic growth. Equity relates to
the fairness of the distribution of well-being among the mem-
bers of society. But defining fairness involves normative
judgements that go beyond the realm of economics and en-
ters into the realm of political philosophy.
Therefore, it is important for policy makers to think carefully
about what their equity objectives are. We suggest that equity
is not the same thing as equality. Some increase in income
inequality is completely normal, even desirable, as countries
move from the artificial equality of the soviet system to a sys-
tem where income inequalities provide incentives for people
to get more education, work harder, and take on more re-
sponsibility. It is equitable for people to be rewarded for
working hard, for investing in education or for taking entre-
preneurial risks.
While equity may not mean equality of outcomes, this report
assumes that it does mean equality of opportunity; for exam-
Policy makers are not
only concerned about the
size of the pie but also
about how that pie is
distributed. It is impor-
tant for policy makers to
think carefully about
what their equity objec-
tives are. Our definition
of equity implies the exis-
tence of a safety net to
ensure that the incomes of
the poorest Ukrainians do
not fall below a minimum
level.
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ple in access to education. We also suggest that the state has a
role to play in protecting the most vulnerable in society. Our
definition of equity implies the existence of a safety net to
ensure that the incomes of the poorest Ukrainians do not fall
below a minimum level.
Economic Growth with Equity: Which Strategy for Ukraine?
Policy Studies, March 1999 15
3. Choosing the Right Road
Given the objective of raising living standards, what strategy should Ukraine
follow? We identify three different alternatives for Ukraine: the preservation
strategy, the protectionist strategy or the competitiveness strategy.
kraine stands at a crossroads. Past policies have pro-
duced apparent economic stability but no growth.
Sharply different roads are under discussion today for
Ukraines future. What direction should Ukraine head to seek
a prosperous future?
Ukraine faces a number of options. Indeed, the possible
combinations of policy strategies from which Ukraine could
chose are endless. To facilitate the discussion of alternative
strategic choices, the following chapters examine the prob-
able consequences of three basic strategic options for
Ukraine:
· THE PRESERVATION STRATEGY. Should Ukraine pursue
growth by preserving as much as possible of the status quo
to avoid social problems? This would involve maintaining
a major role for the government in production while
moving only cautiously towards private enterprise.
· THE PROTECTIONIST STRATEGY. Should Ukraine seek
growth by protecting its domestic farms and factories
from excessive competition? This would involve imple-
menting protective measures designed to stimulate do-
mestic production within a relatively closed, self-
sufficient market economy.
· THE COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY. Or should Ukraine
pursue growth by creating an open market economy and
encouraging competition. This would involve removing
barriers to competition and limiting the Government's
role to facilitation rather than ownership and participa-
tion in production.
Each of these policy directions has worked for at least some
time in various countries. There is no absolutely "right" or
"wrong" answer to these questions. Each path could conceiva-
bly produce improved living standards in Ukraine someday,
at least for a while. The strategy that Ukraine ultimately
chooses will almost certainly, as in every other country, be a
blend of these strategies. However, one of these strategies is
likely to dominate. In choosing what strategy should domi-
UThe following chaptersexamine the probable
consequences of three
basic strategic options for
Ukraine: (1) the preser-
vation strategy, (2) the
protectionist strategy, (3)
the competitiveness strat-
egy.
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nate, it is vitally important to understand the probable conse-
quences of each strategy for future living standards in
Ukraine.
The following discussion draws on economic theory, interna-
tional experience and Ukraine's own experience since inde-
pendence in trying to predict the probable consequences of
following the preservation, protection, and competitiveness
strategies. Each strategy is evaluated in terms of the following
criteria:
· The fiscal deficit and, more broadly, the role of govern-
ment in the economy.
· Inflation
· The current account deficit.
· Improvement in overall living standards or economic
growth.
· Employment.
· Distribution of income.
However, before we turn to this evaluation, we need to dis-
cuss briefly an option not mentioned above. This is an option
that many people in Ukraine today consider very attractive:
returning to the past.
Economic Growth with Equity: Which Strategy for Ukraine?
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4. Returning to the Past¾a Non-
Option
Returning to a command economy is not a realistic option for Ukraine. The
economic and political factors that led to the downfall of communism have not
disappeared. In addition, Ukraine no longer enjoys the implicit subsidies that
helped support centralised decision making under the Soviet Union.
ach of the three strategies listed in chapter 3 recognises
that some form of market economy must be developed to
replace the old command economy. Even in Belarus, where
the authorities are pursuing a very cautious pace of reform,
almost everyone, including the President, recognises that the
country will have to depend on some form of market-based
economic organisation. There are at least four reasons why a
return to the past is not a viable option:
· Inherent inefficiency.
· The rise in energy prices.
· The end of inter-republican subsidies.
· Globalisation.
4.1 Inherent Inefficiency
The old command-and-control system was inherently ineffi-
cient and collapsed of its own internal weaknesses, as the
economy became more sophisticated. In the fairly simple,
largely agrarian society that existed in the early years of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a relatively small group of
centralised bureaucrats could make basic decisions without
great inefficiency.
However, as the economies of the FSU became increasingly
complex, centralised decision-makers lacked the information
they need to make good decisions about production and dis-
tribution. The decisions to be made regarding investment
priorities, sources of materials, production methods, labour
management, and marketing became increasingly specific to
individual, specialised lines of production. These information
problems led Soviet authorities to direct an ever-higher share
of national income into investment that, in the end, added
almost nothing to output.
E
The old command-and-
control system was inher-
ently inefficient and col-
lapsed of its own internal
weaknesses, as the econ-
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natural resources of con-
tinental Russia. In con-
trast, the Soviet system
grossly under-utilised the
regions most valuable
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Investment and Rates of Return in Soviet
Industry
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The Soviet system survived as long as it did partly because a
lot of good people tried very hard to make the system work.
Even more importantly, the system was supported by the im-
mense natural resources of continental Russia. A price of this
survival was massive and perhaps irreparable environmental
damage, as wealth was stripped from mines, oil and gas fields,
forests, waterways, and agricultural land in order to support
the failing Soviet system.
In contrast, the Soviet system grossly under-utilised the re-
gions most valuable resource: its people. By centralising deci-
sion making, the system dis-empowered the talented, well-
educated people of these republics. People working daily in
farms and factories were in the best position to make produc-
tion decisions. They knew what really needed to be done to
improve productivity, but were not allowed to put the fruits of
their knowledge and understanding to full effect. Nor were
they given the incentive to press for improvements. And it was
the state, as owner of virtually all productive assets, that
reaped the benefits.
The result was an increasing impoverishment of the people
who, towards the end of the regime, were forced to stand in
long lines even for the necessities of life and who were paid in
money for which there were no goods. (It is ironic to note that
today, in the virtualised economies, the opposite problem has
developed. People are paid in goods for which there is no
money.) While many people had large savings accounts, the
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money was almost worthless as the economy could not pro-
duce or import enough goods to meet the demand repre-
sented by that money.
In an economy without controlled prices, the money printed
to pay workers under the Soviet system would have caused
inflation. The rising prices would have balanced the supply of
money with the physical supply of goods. That was not allowed
to happen until the break-up of the FSU. When price controls
were removed, inflation surged, destroying the value of
households savings.
4.2 Energy Prices
The sharp increase in energy prices also prevents a return to
the past. Under the Soviet system Ukraine had access to artifi-
cially cheap energy supplies. For example, hydrocarbon en-
ergy supplies, such as oil and gas, were priced for domestic
production at about one-tenth of the prevailing world prices.
Energy was also grossly under-priced in terms of the environ-
mental damage it created during extraction, transport and
use. The damage was most notable - or to be more precise,
devastating - in the case of the Chernobyl disaster. Residual
liabilities of this era are still found throughout the region,
including in Ukraine in terms of dangerous nuclear plants,
many which are still operating, and tons of nuclear waste.
The energy intensive Soviet system can not survive using en-
ergy costed at full value. As Ukraine is not energy self-
sufficient and must import fuel at world prices, it has to follow
a strategy that forces the efficient use of energy.
4.3 Inter-Republican Subsidies
A return to the past is also impossible because Ukraine can no
longer depend on the massive inter-republican subsidies that
once helped disguise the inefficiencies of the Soviet system.
The most important of these subsidies has already been noted
¾ Ukraine's access to energy at prices far below world market
levels. But Ukraine also depended on other subsidies that
were indirectly financed by the vast natural resource wealth of
Russia. The best example is probably the large and very so-
phisticated defence industry that the Soviet Union developed
on Ukrainian soil. The tanks, aeroplanes, and rockets that
Ukraine produced were paid for by the Soviet military ma-
chine which in turn was fed by a government that exploited a
vast base of natural resources. This implicit subsidy of mili-
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tary, which once accounted for around one third of total
Ukrainian industrial output, has come to an end. Ukraine can
no longer rely on guaranteed Russian markets and must de-
velop new markets for its products.
4.4 Globalisation
The globalisation of the world is a fourth reason why Ukraine
can never go back to a Soviet system. With instant world-wide
communications, rebuilding an Iron Curtain that keeps aver-
age people more or less ignorant of life in the rest of the
world would be virtually impossible today. In fact, modern
communications were instrumental in bringing down the
former Soviet Union. Attempts to impose soviet-style controls,
including the limitation of consumer choice, would quickly
meet with widespread opposition today.
For Ukraine to cut itself off from participation in global eco-
nomic markets would be an economic disaster. Ukraine has
always depended heavily on international trade. Even during
Soviet days, total trade turnover (imports plus exports) was
equal to 50% to 60% of GDP, a figure that today stands at
90% to 100%. This increase reflects the increased openness to
global markets and the fundamental realignment of the ex-
change rates used to value trade relative to GDP.
Pre-industrial, self-sufficient agrarian economies can shut
themselves off from international trade. But this is impossible
for a country like Ukraine with sophisticated industries such
as aeroplanes, rockets, tanks, iron and steel, and chemicals.
Ukraine needs a global market to maintain economic scales of
production in these highly technical and competitive prod-
ucts.
4.5 Ukraine Can Not Go Back
These reasons highlight that it is impossible to recreate an
economy in Ukraine based on centralised controls and ad-
ministrative fiat. The old centrally controlled soviet system
proved incapable of dealing efficiently with the complexities
of a modern industrial economy. It also proved incompatible
with the existence of the basic democratic freedoms and re-
sponsibilities that are so important to people everywhere in
the world, including the people of Ukraine. Some form of
market economy where resources are allocated and produc-
tion decisions are made by individuals on the basis of prices,
rather than by bureaucrats on the basis of state plans, is the
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only solid foundation for a modern Ukraine. Therefore,
Ukraine can not go back. But in which direction should it go
forward?
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5. The Preservation Strategy
Belarus is an example of how to preserve the best of what was previously present (in the Soviet
Union)  something that positively influenced its economic development.
- O. Tkachenko, 28 January 1999.
The preservation strategy involves a slow movement towards a market economy
with the greatest possible maintenance of the status quo. Under this strategy,
Government maintains existing structures of ownership and control and seeks to
preserve the social benefits of the Soviet regime.
Advantages:
The maintenance of subsidies to agricultural and industrial enterprises avoids the
sharp initial drop in production and employment that would result from their
removal. Maintaining the status quo also reduces social stress and political
tensions.
Disadvantages:
Long term growth prospects are damaged by the continued support of inefficient
production and the cost of financing high government spending. This results in
high interest rates, scarcity of working and investment capital, banking system
instability, external payments problems, enterprise losses, mounting arrears in wage
and social payments, rising unemployment, and inevitably, falling living
standards.
5.1 The Strategy
The preservation strategy is based on the premise that the
Government can preserve the social benefits of the Soviet re-
gime while still moving towards a market-based economy. To
avoid enterprise closures and layoffs, Government provides
extensive support to enterprises so that they can continue
working and providing employment despite low sales and
losses. Also, to avoid conflicts with groups such as the manag-
ers and workers of state enterprises and collective farms, and
with government officials, the government should seek to
preserve the existing structures of ownership and control.
This strategy is being pursued with particular vigour today in
this region by the authorities in Belarus. Similar strategies
have also been followed in the past through out the world,
most notably in the totalitarian states of Africa and Latin
America.
The preservation strategy
is based on the premise
that the Government can
preserve the social benefits
of the Soviet regime while
still moving towards a
market-based economy.
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However, the strategy has not been limited to countries with
totalitarian governments. Essentially similar policies have
been followed in the past by more populist but still centrally-
controlled governments such as those in Nayerie's Tanzania,
Allende's Chile, Garcia's Peru, and Peron's Argentina.
5.2 Evaluating the Preservation
Strategy
In this section the impact of the preservation strategy is pre-
dicted and evaluated in terms of the criteria we identified in
section 2 and 3. Although no one can be certain what the fu-
ture consequences of any specific strategy will be, evaluating
the recent experience of Ukraine gives a good idea of the
probable consequences of the preservation strategy, for many
of the policies that Ukraine has followed since independence
fit comfortably within the preservation strategy.
At the same time, it would be wrong to describe Ukraine's
overall policies to date as status quo preservation. In areas
such as privatisation of small and medium enterprises, intro-
duction of its own national currency, establishment of a more
modern system of taxation, and development of the govern-
ance structures of an independent nation, Ukraine has clearly
been leaving the past behind. But in other areas Ukraine has
tended to preserve the status quo. These include the structure
of agriculture, the ownership of large enterprises, the devel-
opment of a modern framework of laws and institutions, and
foreign trade policies.
5.2.1 Fiscal Position
A preservation strategy implies no significant revision of gov-
ernment spending or of the role of government in Ukraine.
The government would maintain current employment levels
in the public sector and spending in social areas, such as
health and education. It would also continue to play a large
role in subsidising enterprises through direct payments and
tax concessions. To preserve the current size of government
relative to GDP, the government will either have to run large
deficits or increase tax rates.
Any effort to close the budget deficit by increasing tax reve-
nues would fall heavily on the production of goods and serv-
ices. Taxation on production in Ukraine is estimated to have
accounted for about 73% of total tax revenues in 1998. The
tax burden on legal enterprises is exacerbated as about half of
A preservation strategy
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all economic activity in Ukraine hides in the shadow economy
where it is not taxed. Of the other half of enterprises, about
half are not profitable. Thus, in terms of corporate profit tax,
the burden falls on about one quarter of all economic activity.
Increases in taxes would further erode the profitability of po-
tentially viable enterprises, reducing their ability to invest and
grow. This would drive more enterprises into the shadow
economy.
If instead the Government finances the current level of ex-
penditure through deficits, the consequence will be a contin-
ued high cost of capital for private enterprises. It is largely
because of high budget deficits that investment capital in
Ukraine is both scarce and extraordinarily expensive. This
can be very costly for economic growth, particularly in the
longer term. Investment is an important source of future
growth and productivity through its contribution to the na-
tions capital stock.
If the Government continues to run high budget deficits, it
will be forced to borrow at an increasingly high cost, until it
can no longer afford to pay its debt servicing obligations. At
that point, the Government would be forced to restructure its
debts, effectively cutting it off from further borrowing
abroad. Meanwhile, the severe scarcity of capital in the do-
mestic market would make further borrowing there extremely
difficult, forcing the government to default on its payment
obligations and to accumulate arrears. These risks are obvi-
ously not theoretical. In fact, such problems are already quite
visible in Ukraine today.
5.2.2 Inflation
There is another way that the government could finance its
deficits. It could borrow from the central bank by printing
money. Under the preservation scenario, it is likely that the
government would come under increasing pressure to do just
that. As borrowing becomes increasingly difficult and costly,
the government would again resort to printing money as it
did in the early 1990s.
The borrowing may be small at first, taking the form of resid-
ual central bank purchases of t-bills that did not sell in the t-
bill auctions, something that has been happening with great
regularity since the crisis of late 1998. Borrowing from the
central bank would gradually become more visible and im-
portant relative to the bank's total assets, making it difficult
for the Government to remain in compliance with IMF ceil-
Under the preservation
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ings on net domestic assets. The sale of foreign exchange
would offset part of the monetary emission, but once reserves
fall to dangerously low levels, IMF conditions would be
breached. This would prompt the World Bank to cut off its
lending, making the situation even more acute. With no ac-
cess to domestic or foreign borrowing, and with public sector
employees and pensioners clamouring to be paid, the Gov-
ernment would have any choice but to begin large-scale
monetary emission, thus triggering another round of hyperin-
flation.
Ukraine: Real Exchange Rate Index and CPI
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If domestic inflation exceeds the pace of inflation in trading
partner countries, Ukraine will come under pressure to fur-
ther devalue its exchange rate. During the hyperinflation of
1993-94, Ukraine devalued sharply, keeping the real
(inflation-adjusted) exchange rate more or less stable. Allow-
ing the nominal exchange rate to depreciate in the face of
rapid domestic inflation preserves Ukraines competitive po-
sition, but aggravates an already unstable price environment,
making investment decisions very risky.
If Ukraine tries to keep a stable" exchange rate as a nominal
anchor to stabilise the economy, the results are likely to be
disastrous unless the country pursues equally tight fiscal pol-
icy. If fiscal policy remains loose and the exchange rate re-
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mains relatively fixed, inflation will make Ukraines goods
increasingly uncompetitive in foreign markets.
Indeed, if Ukraine does want to maintain a steady exchange
rate, the best approach is to maintain firm fiscal and mone-
tary policy. If a country has limited deficit-financing require-
ments, the pressure to expand monetary emission will be
modest, inflation will be low, and the exchange rate will natu-
rally tend to be stable in the absence of strong exogenous
shocks, such as a major change in oil prices.
5.2.3 Current Account Deficit
If a preservation strategy involves policy makers attempting to
keep the exchange rate stable in the face of high rates of infla-
tion, the current account implications are not rosy. Ukraine is
already experiencing current account problems. However,
these can not all be attributed to the preservation strategy. In
fact, Ukraine's earliest external payments problems were the
result of developments over which it had almost no control:
· The loss of traditional markets that came with the break-
up of the former Soviet Union.
· The sharply higher energy prices that resulted from Rus-
sia's decision to begin exporting its abundant energy re-
sources at international prices.
However, the loss of traditional markets and the oil price
shock were common to all republics of the former Soviet Un-
ion. Many adjusted more quickly and more successfully than
Ukraine. For example, the Baltic States quickly compensated
for the higher energy costs and the loss of traditional markets
by improving production efficiency and developing new mar-
kets.
In contrast, Ukraine has failed to adjust successfully to the
loss of traditional markets and to develop new products and
markets. As a result, the merchandise trade balance has dete-
riorated from a surplus of nearly USD 2 billion in 1991 to a
merchandise trade deficit of over USD 4 billion in 1996 and
1997. A somewhat smaller deficit was realised for 1998, but
this is more the result of the sharp decline in imports result-
ing from the problems in Asia and Russia than success in
stimulating exports. Merchandise exports, in fact, are ex-
pected to decline significantly compared to 1997.
While we can discuss the current account deficit as the differ-
ence between imports and exports, it is also important to re-
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member that the deficit represents the difference between
national savings and investment. The only way to invest more
than domestic savings is to access the savings of the rest of the
world. This has been the case in Ukraine during the past sev-
eral years. While investment has been weak, domestic savings
have been even weaker. Budget deficits have been a signifi-
cant driver of the weak national savings. The negative saving
of government has significantly reduced national savings and
contributed to the widening current account deficit.
Cumulative FDI-inflows 1989-97 per capita
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Government foreign borrowing also puts upward pressure on
the exchange rate. This exacerbates the current account prob-
lems by making Ukrainian goods and services less competitive
relative to foreign goods. High government debt makes for-
eign investors increasingly nervous about investing in
Ukraine. This helps explain the extraordinarily low level of
foreign direct investment in Ukraine compared to other
countries in the region.
As the preservation strategy almost inevitably leads to growing
government deficits, the current account deficit will also be-
come wider. If a nation is using foreign capital to build its
productive capacity, the resulting current account deficit is of
less concern because the investments will generate a return to
repay foreign lenders and investors. However, if Ukraine bor-
rows to finance consumption, it will ultimately have to reduce
future living standards to repay this debt.
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5.2.4 Economic Growth
Employing elements of the preservation strategy helped the
Ukrainian people avoid sharp reductions in living standards
in the early years of independence. The subsidies to agricul-
ture and industry maintained production, and thus the in-
comes of workers, despite the severe shocks caused by the
break-up of the former Soviet Union.
However, our evaluation suggests that this maintenance of
living standards was accomplished at the cost of future eco-
nomic growth. As discussed in section 5.2.1, the large gov-
ernment sector will continue to inhibit economic growth no
matter how it is financed. But perhaps the most harmful ele-
ment of the preservation strategy for economic growth is the
lack of hard budget constraints. This has removed the incen-
tive for producers to look for ways to raise productivity and
minimise costs. It has also reduced the movement of re-
sources to those enterprises that could use them most effec-
tively.
Hard budget constraints mean that all institutions, including
government, enterprises and households, have to pay for
what they consume. Furthermore, they can not consume
more than they can earn or borrow on a sustainable basis.
Hard budget constraints force individuals, enterprises, and
governments to make hard decisions about priorities, thus
maximising the efficiency of resource use and economic
growth. In the production sector, the arrears that have built
up because enterprises are unable to pay their workers, sup-
pliers, bank loans, and taxes is clear evidence that the enter-
prises are not living within their means.
If individual, enterprises, and government bodies do not live
within their means and pay for what they use, prices become
irrelevant. If an enterprise does not pay its electricity bill, a
price of $40 per thousand kWh is simply an illusion. The real
price is zero. If the real price is zero, the enterprise will make
no effort to reduce its energy consumption. If the worker
does not get paid, the wage is not UAH 100 per month. The
real wage is zero. At that price, the enterprise will preserve
existing staffing levels, thereby avoiding the uncomfortable
process of laying off workers, a process that would encourage
them to look for more productive employment.
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Belarus: a Success Story for the Preservation Strategy?
Proponents of the preservation strategy often point to Belarus as evidence of the success of taking
the transition from the command to market economy slowly.
Economic growth reached 11% in 1997, and despite a serious slump in trade with Russia to-
wards the end of the year, growth in Belarus in 1998 was still about 10%.
But its hard to reconcile these figures with the fate of the average Belarusian. A survey by the sci-
entific research institute of the Ministry of Economy shows that peoples expectations have become
steadily worse over the last two years. In the fourth quarter of 1996, 46% of people expected the
material status of their family to get worse over the next six months. By late 1998, during this so-
called miracle of 10% growth, the share had increased to 78%. By early 1998 even President
Lukashenko demanded to know from his Cabinet why living standards were getting worse despite
the economic growth.
In short, economic growth does not appear to be translating into improved living standards for
the Belarusian people. Why not? Unfortunately, this success is not real. Official GDP appears
high because of a system of barter and non-payment, where the prices are artificially high. Belaru-
sian enterprises, using materials that they have taken on credit from abroad and using National
Bank loans, are manufacturing products whose real prices are lower than the cost of the factors of
production used to make them, then they are shipping a major share of the resulting output back to
Russia on a barter basis to pay for the materials, leaving little if any real net gain for the people.
Large volumes of food products are also exported both as part of barter agreements to pay for im-
ported energy and materials and in response to price controls in the domestic market.
GDP has been further overstated by enterprises taking advantage of the National Bank attempt to
restrain exchange rate fluctuations. The spread between the official and market rates for the Be-
larusian rouble was small in 1996 but jumped up to 10% in 1997. The spread means that en-
terprises can increase their profits by getting an intermediary to buy their products for Belarusian
roubles, sell them in a foreign currency and convert the money back into Belarusian roubles. To
legalise this process in their accounts at the official rate, enterprises overstate their quantitative
output. Its no coincidence that economic growth in Belarus began in April 1996 after the spread
between official and market exchange rates began to increase.
The gains in official GDP may therefore be as much an illusion as an accurate reflection of the
economic circumstances of the Belarus people. Actual living standards continue to erode as the
flight of food from Belarus to Russia through barter and smuggling leave the shelves bare for im-
portant products like cheese, butter, meat and eggs.
Without the threat of bankruptcy, enterprises have no incen-
tive to voluntarily undertake the measures needed to become
more efficient. The threat of losing ones job as a manager or
ones assets as an owner fosters changes that bring efficiency
and expenditure discipline. These changes may include sell-
ing off unused assets, finding new equity partners, voluntarily
restructuring and privatising, investing in new equipment
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and technology to improve production efficiency and prod-
uct quality, or for seeking out new markets.
The problems are exacerbated by a crumbling banking sector.
The banking sector in Ukraine is already weak because most
of the banks are either small start-up-banks with no previous
experience and little capital, or they are large banks left over
from the Soviet era that are struggling to restructure them-
selves and operate in a market economy. They are weakened
further when they are forced to lend money to the Govern-
ment and to public enterprises at artificially low interest rates.
Their profitability is further hit by the high reserve require-
ments that the central bank introduces to reduce domestic
liquidity and prop up the exchange rate.
Faced with low profitability, the hard-pressed commercial
banks extend increasingly risky loans to failing enterprises at
high interest rates to compensate. When enterprises fail to
repay their loans on time, the banks face a serious liquidity
crunch.
Under such conditions, providing liquidity support to avert a
crisis would be inadvisable without restructuring. This would
involve the merger or closure of under-capitalised banks or
their acquisition by other investors, including foreign banks.
However, this approach would not be consistent with the
preservation strategy. As a result, the liquidity problems be-
come a solvency crisis. More banks, their meagre assets
eroded by bad loans, would close their doors. When the bank-
ing crisis becomes unavoidable, it will be quite destructive. By
disrupting the flow of payments, the crisis makes it impossible
for otherwise good banks and creditors to make payments,
thereby triggering widespread loan defaults. The economic
decline would inevitably become worse after such a crisis, and
restoring growth would become an even longer and more
painful process.
5.2.5 Employment
The preservation strategy has the advantage of maintaining
official employment levels in the short term. It avoids the lay-
ing off of large numbers of public sector employees and
maintains employment opportunities within businesses that
would be bankrupt if subsidies were withdrawn.
However, official employment levels would be deceptive. The
growth of wage arrears suggests that many enterprises are un-
able to pay their employees. Under these circumstances, em-
ployment does not convey many benefits to the worker. If
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even subsidised enterprises are unable to pay their employ-
ees, the workers must not be making a significant contribu-
tion to the value of goods and services produced in Ukraine.
By keeping them employed in unproductive industries, the
Government is preventing workers from moving to those ar-
eas where they would add value.
If the preservation strategy is harmful to economic growth,
over the longer term it will limit the opportunities for new job
creation. Achieving economic growth is the best way to gener-
ate new employment opportunities. In addition, if the strat-
egy resulted in an overvalued exchange rate (see section
5.2.2), it could also have harmful effects on employment. It
creates a bias against employment. When imported capital
equipment is made artificially cheap through an artificial ex-
change rate, producers will tend to substitute imported
equipment for domestic workers or domestically produced
equipment. An overvalued exchange rate also makes im-
ported consumer goods artificially inexpensive, leading con-
sumers to prefer imported goods over those which are domes-
tically produced. This reduces the profits of domestic pro-
ducers and thus their ability to pay taxes, to repay bank loans,
to use domestic materials as inputs and to hire new workers.
5.2.6 Equity
On the positive side, the preservation strategy clearly has two
advantages in terms of equity. These help explain why
Ukraine has tended to follow this strategy during the past
seven years. First, most people like stability and dislike
change. Unless the current situation becomes intolerable,
humans instinctively prefer the status quo. Second, change
almost always brings a degree of civil and political unrest be-
cause it upsets the established order and the associated vested
interests. By pursuing a strategy of very gradual change,
Ukraine has protected vested interests and minimised politi-
cal and civil unrest.
However, by protecting vested interests, the preservation
strategy tends to underscore existing income inequalities in
society. It generally favours a limited group of powerful indi-
viduals with a vested interest in the status quo. To preserve
social peace, the government does not rock the boat.
There is evidence of growing inequality of the income distri-
bution in Ukraine. There are some particularly vulnerable
groups in society. The most vulnerable group in Ukraine to-
day is families with more than three children  especially if
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the family is headed by a single parent (usually a woman).
This group is about twice as likely to be poor as the average
household. Pensioners are commonly regarded as being the
most likely group to fall below the poverty line.
Therefore, the preservation strategy protects enterprises,
rather than protecting people. Money that could be spent on
protecting the most vulnerable in society is instead directed
towards those that have political clout. Providing subsidies
and tax exemptions to inefficient enterprises benefits only
those who own and manage the enterprise. It does not benefit
those workers who are not paid despite continuing employ-
ment and work. It does not benefit consumers who can not
buy the goods and services that they want to as resources are
channelled into unproductive enterprises. It does not benefit
the owners and employees of productive enterprises who are
forced to pay high taxes to finance their unproductive coun-
terparts.
5.3 Summary
The preservation strategy avoids some of the social costs in-
volved in moving from a centrally planned to a market based
economy. However, the strategy does not appear to be sus-
tainable and only postpones the costs associated with the in-
evitable transition to a market economy. Overall, preservation
will ultimately fail to promote the Governments objectives of
economic growth and equity. Is there a better way? The fol-
lowing chapters explore two fundamentally different strate-
gies for bringing about the economic changes needed to re-
store, preserve, and enhance the living standards of the peo-
ple of Ukraine.
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6. Protection strategy
External and internal forces interested in the uncontrolled import of certain products have actively
blocked state regulations that could protect Ukrainian producers. . . .The economic crisis can be
overcome, but only by an economy founded on domestic production."
Ukrainian League of Consumers and Producers.
The protectionist strategy involves shielding selected domestic industries from
competition with external and other domestic producers. Protection from
external sources can take many forms including tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Privileged domestic enterprises may be protected from domestic competition by
fiscal, quasi-fiscal and regulatory instruments.
Advantages
The protection strategy often stimulates investment, including from foreign
investors who want to get behind the tariff wall. Old factories take on new life;
new factories are built, and jobs are created. Tariffs and import duties can also
generate revenue for the Government.
Disadvantages
Protectionist measures make factors such as access to decision-makers and special
privileges more important to the financial success of an enterprise than production
efficiency and effective marketing. As a result, they tend to lead to economic
inefficiencies, making goods and services more expensive for consumers. These
inefficiencies ultimately undermine economic growth.
6.1 The Strategy
Protectionist strategies come in many different varieties. In
the most conservative form, protection is limited to competi-
tion from selected imported products for a limited period of
time. At the other extreme protection may involve prohibitive
tariffs, quantitative restrictions, import bans, and quality cer-
tification procedures that virtually eliminate external com-
petitors. On the domestic side, protection can be offered
through subsidies, privileges, and preferential state procure-
ment for selected domestic producers, often public sector
enterprises, which have trouble competing with other domes-
tic producers.
This chapter will not explore the many variants of the protec-
tion strategy, but will focus on the key instruments and tactics
of protection that have been used or are being considered in
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Ukraine. It then examines their implications for the govern-
ments fiscal accounts, inflation, the current account, eco-
nomic growth employment and income distribution.
6.1.1 Protection from External Competition
The main approaches that Ukraine uses to protect domestic
producers from external competition are:
· TARIFF BARRIERS. Specific and ad valorem duties are the
most common instruments for protection against im-
ports. In Ukraine, the weighted average duty is about
11% and about 5% under the favourable scheme.2 The
highest duties (up to 60%) apply to agricultural products.
Seasonal tariffs may also be imposed on these products,
and these can roughly double the normal tariff rate, yield-
ing maximum rates of up to 100% on vegetables, for ex-
ample.
· EXPORT SUBSIDIES can be used to protect domestic en-
terprises that are having trouble competing with foreign
competition in external markets. Direct export subsidies
appear to be very restricted in Ukraine.
· NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AND SUBSIDIES. These instruments
are increasingly being used in favour of Ukrainian pro-
ducers. Explicit quantitative restrictions on imports are
still limited in Ukraine  applying only to skins, live ani-
mals and meat, and they are intended to protect Ukrain-
ian farmers whose productivity has fallen significantly be-
hind world standards. However, there is considerable po-
tential for immediate, widespread and ad-hoc application
of quantitative restrictions. A Cabinet decision of June 26,
1996, allows import limits to be imposed whenever it is
deemed necessary "to prevent or remove serious damage
to national enterprises." The decision, which provides
only loose guidelines for what qualifies as "serious dam-
age, allows the restrictions to be put into place for up to
eight years.
· IMPLICIT BARRIERS AND SUBSIDIES are perhaps more
prevalent. Much of the trade in agricultural products, for
example, is still controlled through state-owned or state-
controlled, co-operatively owned agricultural enterprises.
These enterprises have the power to favour domestic
                                                                
2 Michael Michaely. 1998. Ukraine: Foreign Trade and Commercial
Policies. World Bank, processed., p. 8.
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producers. As in many countries, quality certification
procedures have the potential to be used to restrict com-
petition from imported goods. Recent well-known cases
in Ukraine include delayed or non-certification of televi-
sion sets, car parts, detergents, and toothpaste from in-
ternationally known producers.
· SUBSIDIES, which can be used to protect domestic pro-
ducers both from foreign and domestic competition, will
be discussed in the following section.
Import duties for top ten product groups
%
Product Mln $ Favorable rate Full rate
min avg max min avg max
Petroleum products 7,807 0 1 2 0 5 10
Non-electrical machinery 1,961 0 4 30 1 12 40
Transport except railway 639 0 9 20 20 21 40
Electrical machinery 634 0 6 25 2 15 40
Pharmaceutical products 424 10 10 10 20 20 20
Plastic goods 367 0 3 10 2 9 10
Rubber 358 1 5 5 5 10 20
Paper, carton 327 0 7 25 2 11 40
Other chemical products 264 0 3 10 5 9 10
Optical, photo, med equip 231 0 6 10 1 14 20
Notes: This table covers 76 percent of all products by value in 1997.
Source: Ministry of Finance and bank staff estimate
6.1.2 Protection from Internal Competition
Although popular attention tends to be focused on the issue
of protection from foreign competition, protection from
more efficient domestic producers is also common in
Ukraine. Protection for less-efficient producers comes
through fiscal, quasi-fiscal and non-fiscal measures.
· FISCAL PROTECTION. Ukraine has made significant re-
ductions in the use of fiscal measures to protect selected
enterprises. In 1994 "Support to the National Economy"
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accounted for 13% of GDP, of which a major share went
to support loss-making agricultural enterprises. By 1998
this had dropped to 2% of GDP. Similarly the use of di-
rected credits from the budget to enterprises has de-
clined sharply. In 1992 these amounted to 13% of GDP,
but had fallen to zero by 1996. On the revenue side, the
government provides substantial amounts of support
worth an estimated UAH 1.7 billion in the form of pref-
erential or zero tax rates and by failing to take enter-
prises into bankruptcy court for the non-payment of
taxes. In some cases, such as the elimination of value
added taxes on meat and milk products in the agricul-
ture sector, entire sub-sectors are given preferential tax
treatment. In other cases, individual enterprises are
given special tax and subsidy treatment. This is com-
monly done either because the enterprise is in an area of
strategic importance such as high technology, or be-
cause the government wants to avoid large-scale reduc-
tions in the number of workers employed. Such prefer-
ential protection has been given, for example, to the
AvtoZaz-Daewoo plant in Zaporizhia both on the basis
that the motor vehicle industry is a priority sector and to
protect the 20,000 jobs in the plant.
· QUASI-FISCAL MEASURES. Protection through quasi-fiscal
and non-fiscal measures is still common in Ukraine.
Government-directed commercial bank loans at special
rates, usually to enterprises that would not qualify for
loans under normal commercial criteria, are perhaps the
most important form of protection. Lax enforcement of
loan repayment is another implicit subsidy. Of the out-
standing budgetary loans to enterprises in Ukraine, a
significant share is overdue, and of these, many will al-
most certainly never be repaid in full. Loan guarantees
are another instrument that can be used to protect fa-
voured enterprises. The Ukrainian Government has
guaranteed an estimated USD 2.5 billion of foreign cur-
rency loans for enterprises. Almost all of these enter-
prises are in the public sector or have close political ties.
Of these, the Government has already had to repay loans
totalling USD 1.4 billion, equivalent to about 90% of the
total guaranteed loans maturing. Against this amount, it
has managed to recover around USD 900 million (65%)
repayments in-kind and in local currency. In other
words, the effective default rate is very high, reflecting a
substantial implicit subsidy to these enterprises.
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· NON-FISCAL MEASURES. Complex controls and regula-
tions also provide the Government with a tool to protect
favoured enterprises. Favoured enterprises can be pro-
tected by making it easier for them to operate relative to
their competitors.
Protecting the Automobile Industry
The DAEWOO  AutoZAZ joint venture is the largest single foreign direct investment in the
Ukrainian economy. To attract this investment the Ukrainian Government made a number of
concessions designed to support the development of the infant Ukrainian automobile industry.
These concessions are available to any enterprise that is willing to invest at least $150 million in
the automobile industry. They include:
· A zero VAT and excise rate on the imports of manufacturing equipment, construction ma-
terials and car assembly components.
· Exemption from land tax.
· Exemption of reinvested profits from the enterprises tax liability.
· Exemption of cars assembled in Ukraine from VAT and excise duties.
· Bans on the imports of cars over five years old.
· Tariffs on imported cars.
In return for these concessions, DAEWOO agreed that their workforce would be at least 90%
Ukrainian. Around 20,000 Ukrainians are employed by DAEWOO. However, these jobs have
come at a high cost to the Ukrainian consumer and taxpayer. The imposition of tariffs increases
the price Ukrainians must pay for a new or used car; the import of cars over five years old, which
are very popular in Ukraine, is banned; minimum value of USD 5,000 is imposed in calculating
import duties to be paid; and tax exemptions implicitly increase the tax burden borne by other
Ukrainian enterprises and workers. The cost to consumers varies depending on what foreign
investment Ukraine would get in the absence of these concessions. However, a World Bank esti-
mate suggests the cost of protecting each job in the DAEWOO plant runs into several thousand
US dollars per month. This compares to an average wage in Ukraine of USD71.3 per month for
1998.
To date, local manufacturing has been limited to screwdriver technology. In order to gain ac-
cess to the highly concessional tax treatment on imported parts as opposed to finished cars, the
company is exporting the full-assembled cars from Korea to a neighboring country, removing the
wheels and seats there, then replacing the wheels and seats once the vehicles arrive in Ukraine.
The venture has also not been as successful at boosting production as hoped. In 1998, only
24,000 motor vehicles were produced, significantly lower than the 70,000 planned. Furthermore,
the company is having trouble finding a market even for these cars leaving roughly half of pro-
duction unsold. Production was suspended due to low sales in late 1998 and, at the time of writ-
ing, is not planned to be restarted in the near future.
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6.2 Evaluating the Protection Strategy
In this section we evaluate the probable consequences of the
protectionist strategy in terms of the indicators identified in
chapter 2. These are the consequences for the fiscal situation,
inflation, the current account, economic growth, employ-
ment and distribution of income.
Identifying the probable impacts of the protection strategy
with precision is difficult because the effects can vary greatly
depending on the nature of the instruments used, the degree
to which the policies provide protection from foreign compe-
tition or from competition with other domestic enterprises,
and the intensity with which these instruments are used.
However, we attempt to highlight the key benefits and costs of
a protection strategy.
6.2.1 Fiscal Position
The biggest fiscal advantage of a protection strategy is that, if
well administered, it can generate substantial import tax
revenues. In fact, underdeveloped countries often depend on
import duties for a much larger share of their total tax reve-
nues than in developed countries. In the short term, the
stimulation of investment and output can also boost overall
tax revenues.
Although import duties can help the budget, they can also
have serious drawbacks. In particular, unless the customs
service is well administered and reasonably free from corrup-
tion, a major share of the potential revenues is likely to go
into the pockets of the customs agents. Hard data is not avail-
able, but professionally conducted surveys indicate that the
people of Ukraine regard the customs service as one of the
most corrupt institutions in the country3.
In addition, some aspects of a protection strategy can create
negative fiscal consequences. Subsidies and tax concessions
create budgetary pressures that increase the budget deficit.
They also create a precedent: new enterprises, both domestic
and foreign, will insist on the same tariff protection and tax
give-away packages that previous enterprises enjoyed. It is dif-
                                                                
3 The TI Newsletter of December 1998, for example, reports on the
basis of six different surveys that, between Denmark at 1 and
Cameroon at 85, Ukraine ranks 69 along with Bolivia. Its 1998
integrity score was 2.8 out of a possible 10 points.
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ficult for a government to resist these pressures without going
back on the promises made to all producers. This type of pol-
icy turn-around would risk the exit of enterprises to locations
where policies are more stable and predictable. These prob-
lems have been seen clearly in Ukraine in the case of conces-
sions for foreign direct investment during the past few years.
Some concessions became so costly that the government was
forced to renege on its promises in 1996/97.
The pressures for more fiscal concessions will also come from
those who are already protected. The favoured enterprise
managers quickly learn that there are high returns from lob-
bying and bribing the government to provide more support.
They will therefore divert their attention from managing the
enterprise and marketing their output to campaigning for
additional government support.
In fact, one of the risks of a protection-focused strategy is that
it encourages corruption, not only at the border, but
throughout the economy. Discretionary elements in both pro-
tection and subsidies create opportunities for corruption that
drain resources from the budget and bias investments in favor
of those with political connections and the will to pay bribes.
This undermines the overall investment climate by making it
more costly and risky to do business.
One of the reasons to offer concessions to new industry is to
build a larger tax base, thereby improving the nations fiscal
position. However, the concessions give away the tax base be-
fore it is even created, and clever enterprises around the
world figure out ways to create new companies and take ad-
vantage of new rounds of tax holidays and other fiscal conces-
sions just at the time the Government is set to begin enjoying
a larger tax base. The enterprises that do not win new rounds
of concessions may pack up and leave. This is a particular
problem in the case of footloose industries that, having few
investments in non-movable capital equipment, can easily
move to other countries offering larger tax exemptions. This
includes a major share of the textile, footwear, garment, and
high-tech industries, all of which could be very important to
Ukraines development in the coming years. Therefore, tax
concessions may actually undermine the business climate,
resulting in lower growth as well as more serious fiscal prob-
lems.
A protectionist strategy will not necessarily lead to fiscal prob-
lems. A government could fund subsidies and tax concessions
by cutting expenditures in other areas. But reducing subsidies
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and tax concessions would free government resources to
spend on those things, which the private sector is often poorly
equipped to handle. These include the provision of general
public services, public safety, public health, a major share of
the education facilities, contract enforcement and maintain-
ing public law and order.
6.2.2 Inflation
If the protectionist strategy does lead to fiscal deficits, the
consequences will depend upon the way government finances
these deficits. As under the preservation strategy, the risk for
inflation arises if deficits are funded via borrowing from the
central bank. This would contribute to inflationary instability
that endangers both the banking system and the economy at
large. The instability of the environment that is created, plus
the increasing inefficiency of the protected enterprises, cre-
ates problems for customers to repay their bank loans, adding
to the risk of a banking crisis.
However, if the government manages to maintain fiscal disci-
pline, the protectionist strategy will not have negative conse-
quences for inflation or the banking sector. Any increases in
tariffs will increase consumer prices but, if tariff rates are sta-
ble over time, protection will not make an ongoing contribu-
tion to inflation.
However, there can be risks to the banking system if govern-
ments try to protect enterprises by pressing banks to make
loans to failing enterprises, thus weakening their portfolios.
There is a significant risk of a banking crisis when lending
decisions are not based on a competitive, commercial, arms-
length process. This was one of the main contributors to the
severity of the Asian crisis starting in the fall of 1997.
6.2.3 Current Account
The consequences of a protection strategy for the current ac-
count also depends heavily on the way in which the strategy is
implemented. If only modest levels of import duties are in-
volved that apply equally to all products, and if the level of
protection is stable or falls over time, the initial impact on the
current account may be positive. Import duties will discour-
age imports, thus reducing the trade deficit, at least in the
short term.
If a more aggressive and selective protection strategy is pur-
sued, it can result in serious trade and payment problems al-
most from the outset. One common mistake is to impose high
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duties on finished goods and low duties on intermediate in-
puts and capital equipment. This approach is designed to
stimulate local production by making inputs cheap and pro-
tecting the finished goods from competition. Local produc-
tion will be stimulated, but only at high cost, and the tariff
protection may actually make the trade balance worse.
Why? Enterprises, often in co-operation with foreign inves-
tors, import large volumes of capital goods to establish do-
mestic production facilities behind the tariff walls. They also
import large volumes of intermediate inputs to make the fin-
ished products. The Daewoo-AvtoZaz project noted above is
an example of this problem. Since the domestic scale of pro-
duction is normally far below world levels, the domestic pro-
duction does not enjoy full economies of scale, and conse-
quently uses more inputs to produce the same output, wasting
resources and slowing economic growth. This is a particular
problem with capital equipment, which tends to be under-
utilised because it is designed for world-class levels of produc-
tion and is not available in smaller sizes. When the cost of the
inputs exceeds the value of the output at world prices, the
country may actually end up spending more foreign exchange
for the product than if the product were imported directly.
Even if the protection strategy succeeds in discouraging im-
ports, there can be negative impacts on the trade balance
from the impact of protection on the exchange rate. If high
tariffs discourage imports, they will reduce the demand for
foreign exchange. The upward pressure on the exchange rate
makes exports less profitable and their volume declines.
The bias against exports that is created by protectionist poli-
cies can be corrected if the government introduces export
subsidies and multiple exchange rate policies, but this quickly
leads to even greater problems:
· The government is put into the position of having to
pick the winners entitled to receive the export subsi-
dies.
· If the government tries to avoid having to decide who gets
the subsidy, everyone gets them, and this quickly causes a
fiscal crisis.
· Since the export subsidies are very valuable, enterprise
managers will be willing to pay large bribes to get them,
creating an environment of corruption. The associated
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risks seriously impair the attractiveness of a country as a
location for investment.
6.2.4 Economic Growth
The primary objective of a protection strategy is to encourage
domestic production. Measured by this criterion, the protec-
tion strategy is usually successful initially. Experience with
protection strategies around the world is that such strategies
do initially stimulate production and would probably succeed
in Ukraine for at least a few years. Protection can and does
stimulate investment in the short term. Investment creates
new jobs. And new jobs generally raise living standards
(though these gains can easily be offset by the higher costs of
consumer goods due to inefficient domestic production and
import duties).
Unfortunately, increasing production does not always trans-
late into economic growth. Production will not mean growth
if goods are produced in ways that waste valuable human,
capital and material resources. Protectionist measures, which
are commonly applied on a discretionary basis, make factors
such as access to decision-makers and special privileges more
important to the financial success of an enterprise than pro-
duction efficiency and effective marketing. Good relations
with the power elite become the primary concern of managers
because this can provide protection from competition. Lack
of competition leads to falling production efficiency and fal-
ling product quality, necessitating even more protection that
becomes more and more costly to provide.
The success of a protectionist strategy ultimately depends on
the ability of government to pick winners. If a government is
going to pass out favours to protect specific enterprises, it has
to decide which enterprises are worth protecting. Problems
arise even in the absence of corruption. Serious government
officials often try hard, as under GosPlan, to identify the en-
terprises with the greatest potential for contributing to GDP
and higher living standards. However, the experience of the
Soviet system, as well as that of protection-focused countries
around the world, illustrates that it is almost impossible for a
government official to know enough about alternative lines of
economic activity which have the best potential for long-term
growth. In particular, it seems unlikely that the government is
better able to identify winners than economic agents who are
willing to invest their own money in a particular enterprise.
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International Experience with Protectionism
Many countries around the world have dabbled in protectionism to a greater or lesser extent.
Protection in its extreme form was seen in the Latin American region in the 1960s and 1970s.
The results were very bad in terms of efficiency and economic growth, and most countries in the
region have now moved to a competitiveness strategy. Protection of a somewhat less extreme form
was common until recently in the East Asia region. Here the relatively more modest levels of gov-
ernment intervention and protection from imports seemed to produce very good results: the much-
discussed "East Asian Miracle." But as the recent Asian crisis has clearly shown, the system had
profound weaknesses, and when it began to disintegrate, the collapse in living standards was
profound. Arguments in favour of Asian-style protectionism are heard much less frequently today
than they were even in 1997.
As shown by the recent collapse of the East Asian Miracle, the artificially propelled ride driven
by protectionism and crony capitalism can be exhilarating as long as it lasts. But in the end, the
lack of competition leads to falling production efficiency and product quality, necessitating even
more protection that be-comes more and more costly to provide. The protection may come through
higher tariff levels as in the case of Latin America, or it may come through privileged access to
bank loans as in the case of the East Asian countries. Ultimately, as again seen in the East
Asian experience, the system will collapse because of its intrinsic inefficiency.
The evidence from countries around the world indicates that restructuring a protected economy
will ultimately be inevitable and unavoidable. Cases can be cited from countries on every conti-
nent in the world. Examples can even be drawn from the experience of countries that are other-
wise successful and competitive but which, for political reasons, have chosen to protect certain
sectors. These include the coal industry in Britain, the textile and steel industries in the United
States, the rural sector in France, the banking industry in Japan, and the industrial sector in
Korea.
While the protectionist strategy may appear to work in the
short term, the negative consequences of the strategy would
emerge over time. As the number of protected enterprises
increased, and as the degree of protection that they required
to keep operating increased, consumers would face decreases
in their real incomes, as they would increasingly have to pay
more for less. High costs of production would translate into
high product prices and low quality of goods and services.
Unfortunately, removing existing protectionism can be costly.
Once investments have been made in protected industries,
for example, it can take a long time and a lot of money to
convert these into enterprises that are competitive on world
markets. If access to international capital markets has become
difficult, the country must divert scarce domestic resources
from consumption to investment. The consequent decline in
living standards always makes adjustment programs painful
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and unpopular. However, the IMF and World Bank will come
to the assistance of countries like Ukraine if they wish to move
away from a protectionist strategy. These organisations can
reduce the extent to which the people of the country must
sacrifice consumption in order to undertake the investments
required to help the country restore growth.
6.2.5 Employment
The protectionist strategy can be successful at protecting jobs,
at least in the short term. Without protection some enter-
prises may collapse leading to job losses and growing unem-
ployment.
However, as discussed in section 6.2.4, limits to protection
will eventually be reached and enterprises will begin to lose
money. As a consequence wage arrears would build, new job
opportunities would decline and unemployment would in-
crease. Basically the government will not be able to protect
jobs in inefficient industries forever. A protectionist strategy
may simply delay the costs to workers in inefficient enter-
prises.
The strategy may even increase costs to workers. By delaying
their move to more profitable enterprises, it will reduce la-
bour productivity and the ability of workers to earn higher
wages. Over the longer term, by hindering the development
of new productive enterprises, a protectionist strategy is likely
to limit new job opportunities.
6.2.6 Distribution of Income
The protectionist strategy is often defended on equity
grounds. In particular, if a country already has protected en-
terprises or industries, opening them up to competition may
result in bankruptcy. This can impose high costs on the own-
ers, managers and workers of those enterprises.
The removal of protection is often strongly opposed politi-
cally because the benefits to protection are concentrated with
one or a few producers, while the costs are diffused or widely
spread. The costs are faced by the thousands or millions of
consumers who must pay higher prices for goods and services
and by taxpayers who fund the payment of subsidies and tax
concessions. Protection represents a transfer from consumers
and non-protected enterprises to protected enterprises. As a
result, the costs are often paid by the most vulnerable in soci-
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ety such as pensioners who must pay more for goods and serv-
ices produced by protected industries.
While diffuse, the costs to consumers are usually greater than
the benefits to protected plants and workers. Overall it will
probably be less costly to protect these workers via unem-
ployment benefits and training programs that help them find
new employment.
6.3 Summary
There are both winners and losers from a protectionist strat-
egy. Following this strategy does help to maintain production
and employment levels for at least a short period. If Govern-
ment is successful at picking winners, limited protectionism
may help develop new industries and deliver economic
growth over longer periods. However, the information con-
straints on policy makers creates a significant risk that re-
sources will be channelled into inefficient industries (see box
on international experience). The strategy will not add to the
productive capacity of the economy if resources are directed
towards those industries that are not effective at turning in-
puts into the goods and services demanded on domestic and
foreign markets.
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7. Competitiveness Strategy
only competitive producers can hope for successful trade. Therefore increased competitiveness has
to be one of the priorities of the industrial policies in Ukraine
- A. Vrublevsky, G. Tryneyev and M. Yakubovsky
A competitiveness strategy implies a much smaller role for Government than the
preservation or protectionist strategies. Under this approach, the Government
focuses, not on subsidies that preserve the past or picking winners and
protecting them, but on creating an environment that encourages competition
and gives all producers an equal chance to succeed.
Advantages
Under the competitiveness strategy, resources will be directed towards producing
those goods and services that Ukraine is best at. This reduces the costs of goods and
services to Ukrainian consumers and enhances Ukraines prospects in export
markets, and maximises economic growth, employment and living standards.
Disadvantages
The most significant cost of adopting this strategy would be faced by those workers
in falling enterprises that are unable to stay afloat in the new competitive
environment. While new jobs would be created in more productive industries, these
workers may lack the skills to benefit from the new employment opportunities.
Therefore, there may be pressure on the government to finance unemployment
benefits and retraining schemes during the transition period.
7.1 The Strategy
The tactical measures required under the competitiveness
strategy are actually much simpler for a government to im-
plement than those required under either the status quo
preservation strategy or the protection strategies.
In broad-brush terms, government simply needs to create an
environment that encourages competition and facilitates
business activity. Competition will lead to efficient produc-
tion by ensuring that goods and services are produced by
those who can produce them at least cost. Uninhibited price
signals will also tell producers what goods and services con-
sumers want to buy.
A competitiveness strategy implies that all producers have an
equal chance to succeed. In other words, a government that
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chose to follow a competitiveness strategy would not give in-
dividual enterprises or industries preferential treatment in
terms of subsidies or protection from competition.
7.2 Evaluation of the Competitiveness
Strategy
This section evaluates the competitiveness strategy in terms of
its impact on the fiscal situation, inflation, the current ac-
count, economic growth, employment and equity.
7.2.1 Fiscal Position
Under the competitiveness strategy the Government plays no
direct role in supporting enterprises other than providing
economic and legal infrastructure. However, Government
still has some role to play in allocating resources even under a
competitiveness strategy. In some situations markets fail to
allocate resources efficiently. Even governments that gener-
ally follow a competitiveness strategy intervene in this and
other circumstances where markets may not produce the best
outcome. Sometimes this intervention is to promote eco-
nomic growth and sometimes it is for equity reasons. The ex-
tent and type of government intervention varies across coun-
tries. It depends on the extent to which governments believe
they have the ability to improve the situation and social beliefs
about the role of government in redistributing income.
The size of government can vary greatly among countries pur-
suing competitiveness strategies. However, under the com-
petitiveness strategy any government intervention should fol-
low a strict test. Policy makers should be sure that the social
benefits of intervention outweigh the costs. In addition, when
pursuing equity objectives, governments should ensure they
choose the most efficient way of achieving those objectives.
The competitiveness strategy may put upward pressure on the
government deficit in the short term. Under a competitive-
ness strategy, revenue gained from import duties and tariffs
would be limited. It will also not be cheap to put in place the
institutions that are needed to assure a level playing field for
all producers. Significant investments in legislative founda-
tions, regulations, training, libraries, electronic communica-
tions and salaries will be needed to establish the well-
functioning court and arbitration systems that are needed to
enforce the rules of the game equitably for all competitors.
And money will be needed to create a tax system (including
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customs) that spreads the tax burden as widely as possible and
makes liabilities under the tax laws transparent, predictable
and equitable.
Based on the experience in other countries, however, the to-
tal cost of the investments in these areas would be only a few
percent of GDP. This could be financed initially with the help
of organisations such as the World Bank, then out of the sav-
ings and improved economic activity that such investments
would yield.
The competitiveness strategy would also require increases in
social spending in the short term to protect the most vulner-
able from the costs of transition. Failing old state enterprises
in the agricultural and industrial sectors provide a de facto so-
cial safety net for roughly 8.5 million Ukrainians who work
there. Many of these enterprises are too inefficient to com-
pete on a level playing field and will have to be restructured
dramatically or closed if a competitiveness strategy is imple-
mented. To minimise the social costs from these changes gov-
ernment will need to provide assistance in the form of unem-
ployment benefits, retraining and job search assistance.
However, closing such enterprises, or selling them to private
investors who will restructure them into modern, efficient
enterprises, could save the Government a lot of money. A
positive resource flow should also be generated by privatisa-
tion proceeds.
The fiscal gain from these sources is likely to exceed the costs
of the safety net needed to protect workers. Protecting work-
ers is almost always far cheaper than protecting production,
especially if the production is value subtracting. Further-
more, good economic policies that encourage the creation of
new jobs can greatly reduce the money that will have to be
spent on income support payments to workers who have lost
their jobs. Good tax policies would allow the Government to
capture enough of savings in reduced enterprise subsidies
and tax privileges, and enough of the new economic growth,
to provide the necessary support to disenfranchised workers.
Unfortunately, while the fiscal costs of adopting the competi-
tiveness strategy may be more immediately apparent, many of
these benefits will take time to materialise. On the other
hand, most transitional costs could be financed with foreign
assistance. Institutions such as the IMF and World Bank sup-
port the competitiveness strategy around the world, and if
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Ukraine were to adopt it wholeheartedly, the necessary assis-
tance would be forthcoming.
7.2.2 Inflation
The competitiveness strategy is likely to have positive implica-
tions for inflation. If international organisations finance any
short-term fiscal pressures, there will be less pressure on the
government to print money. In the longer term, reduced sub-
sidies and growing tax revenues will bring the budget closer
to balance. Firmer fiscal policy will assist the National Bank of
Ukraine in its efforts to control inflation.
Reduced inflationary pressures would make it possible to
maintain a stable exchange rate and growing net international
reserves without capital or exchange rate controls. This strat-
egy would facilitate establishing stable exchange rate and the
more stable economic environment would reduce the risk of
investors fleeing Ukraine. This approach is far more effective
than artificial controls designed to restrict the demand for
foreign exchange and increase its supply.
7.2.3 Current Account
In the short run, eliminating controls on foreign exchange
would almost inevitably cause a further devaluation of the
exchange rate. However, this may be desirable. Trying to
maintain the currency at an artificially high level undermines
the competitiveness of Ukraines exports and import compet-
ing firms. Furthermore, the resulting devaluation may be
modest. With the recent devaluation of the hryvnia, the real
exchange rate is now near its level in late 1995. In this period
foreign exchange reserves were relatively stable and net sales
of foreign exchange by the National Bank of Ukraine were
modest.
The reduction or removal of import controls is likely to in-
crease imports into Ukraine. In particular, we are likely to see
an increase in the imports of capital equipment into Ukraine.
While this may initially hurt domestic industries that compete
with imports, they will be forced to become more efficient or
switch to the production of goods and services in which
Ukraine has a comparative advantage. The welfare of Ukrain-
ian households will be enhanced through access to cheaper
imports and domestic goods and services.
Ultimately, the incomes of all Ukrainians will be boosted by
using resources to produce the goods and services that
Ukraine is best at producing. This will generate revenues that
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can be used to purchase imports of things that other countries
can produce for less. For example, imagine you are an owner
of a construction firm. Would you produce your own nails if
you could buy them at a lower cost from another firm? It
maximises your profits to buy the nails from another firm and
spend your time doing what you are best at. It is the same for
the country as a whole.
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With low inflation and a relatively stable, competitive ex-
change rate, exporters would find it easier to prosper in for-
eign markets. This may ultimately offset the impact of any in-
crease in imports on the trade balance. Indeed given
Ukraines rich resources and central location, it has great po-
tential for export success.
Ukraine would probably see an initial increase in its current
account deficit under the competitiveness strategy. But, un-
der these circumstances, this may actually be a desirable out-
come. Remember that the current account deficit is the dif-
ference between national investment and saving. If the com-
petitiveness strategy is successful at creating an attractive in-
vestment climate, we will see an increase in foreign invest-
ment in Ukraine. An increase in foreign investment, by defi-
nition, implies a widening gap between national savings and
investment.
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But in this case, in contrast to the preservation strategy, the
deficit would be driven by investment not consumption. This
type of deficit is desirable, indicating that Ukraine wants to
benefit from foreign direct investment and has established an
environment that attracts foreign savings and investment.
7.2.4 Economic Growth
The analysis above suggests that the competitiveness strategy
would be beneficial for economic growth. With no govern-
ment bailouts, low inflation, realistic and stable prices, and a
stable exchange rate, enterprises would maximise efficiency
by maximising profits. Those who could not make a profit
would restructure or close. Hard budget constraints on en-
terprises ¾ the requirement that every enterprise must pay
for what it uses out of what it earns ¾ would be enforced with
the threat of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy has a negative connotation within the public at
large. But bankruptcy is not death; it is rebirth. When an en-
terprise is bankrupt, with more debts than assets, using its
labour and capital equipment efficiently is almost impossible
because of the lack of working capital. Every dollar that is
earned is subject to confiscation by creditors, including the
government for taxes, the banking system for loans, other
enterprises for materials and, under some circumstances,
workers for wages.
In Ukraine the problem of staying in operation, which is nec-
essary to provide any hope of repaying loans, is made particu-
larly difficult by kartoteka 2 (card-file 2), a system that allows
the government to confiscate funds from enterprise bank ac-
counts without their permission. A court order is not needed
for the Government to put an enterprise into this file, leaving
the enterprise in a very perilous situation. Once in the card-
file, the enterprise has no way to assure that highest priority
creditors are paid first. Kartoteka 2 is a powerful incentive for
enterprises to hide in the shadows, avoiding both the banking
system and the tax authorities.
In contrast, Western-style bankruptcy proceedings allow the
workers and physical assets of an enterprise to being working
again. Some enterprises, of course, are bankrupt because
their equipment is too worn-out and out-of-date to produce
competitive products. Liquidation for such firms is almost
inevitable. However, even here, the real estate owned by the
firm may be of high value, attracting a new investor into the
old location. This investor may possibly employ some of the
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workers from the liquidated enterprise. Under some bank-
ruptcy proceedings, the new owners will assume part of the
debt of the old enterprise in payment for the physical and
other assets received during the restructuring process. Thus,
bankruptcy does not automatically get rid of all the debts, but
it reduces them to a level that will allow the new enterprise to
resume operations. This provides renewed opportunities for
increased employment and output.
Bankruptcies would mean the write-off of many of the current
outstanding loans from the banking system. However, in real-
ity, the real change for the banks would be minimal. Many of
the loans for non-competitive enterprises are already non-
performing. And the better-run banks have already implicitly
marked down the value of non-performing loans in their
books by provisioning. Thus, a competitiveness strategy would
simply reveal the reality that is already well known to the
banks ¾ a lot of their loans are bad and are never going to be
repaid.
Banking losses would arise in the case of enterprises that are
currently able to pay their loans only because of government
subsidies and tax privileges. This support would be cut off
under a competitiveness strategy and could force some loans
into non-accrual status. However, a major share of such loans
appears to be to agriculture, and most of these appear to have
been extended by Bank Ukraine. If this bank were to be re-
nationalised, as has been discussed on occasion, the Govern-
ment would bear the burden of the restructuring. In such a
situation, a major share of the decapitalisation costs could be
covered by savings from reduced subsidies and tax conces-
sions and by increased economic activity and a wider tax base.
By removing any special support from the National Bank or
the Government of Ukraine, a competitiveness strategy would
force commercial banks to lend only to borrowers who were
profitable and could repay the loans. Directed credit and
most confessional lending would come to an end. On balance
this would greatly increase the strength of the banking system,
making it better able to serve the needs of a growing, com-
petitive economy. In the process, some enterprises would
have to restructure, seeking new equity investment partners,
new products and new markets.
A competitiveness strategy would almost certainly lead to the
merger or closure of various banks. Those that were simply
too small to compete and to meet the capitalisation require-
ments but were otherwise well-run would merge, forming
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banks that were strong enough to be successful in a competi-
tive environment. The negative net worth of the worst run
banks would be revealed by the competitive pressures and
those banks would be forced to suspend operations. The
bankrupt banks would sell their remaining assets to new in-
vestors, thus reducing the cost of bankruptcy both to the
original investors and to the depositors.
Such closures and restructurings would have positive effects
almost immediately. This process would prevent bad banks
from continuing to work, taking peoples money and using it
to cover their losses ¾ something that has happened too of-
ten in other countries, creating the risk of a serious systemic
banking failure. A competitiveness strategy would help clean
up the banking system and restore it to health, placing it in
position to support growth and improved living standards.
The competitiveness strategy would also create a virtuous cy-
cle within enterprises. Competitive pressures would lead to
more efficient production and boost profitability. This would
provide resources that the enterprises could use for reinvest-
ment to further improve their efficiency, output, and levels of
employment. The consequent expansion of production levels
would allow enterprises to achieve greater economies of scale,
increasing their ability to export. The improved economic
conditions would attract additional foreign direct investment,
further stimulating the growth process.
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Creating a competitive, financially strong enterprise sector is
one of the best possible ways to attract foreign investors. Ex-
perience around the world suggests that the competitiveness
strategy is more successful ¾ and far less risky for the gov-
ernment ¾ than offering tax give-aways and other conces-
sions.
Investment from abroad is an important way for a transition
country to grow. Even though some of the benefits from the
investment flow back to the foreign owners, this investment
does increase the economys stock of capital, leading to
higher productivity and higher wages. It is also a way to learn
the state-ofthe-art technologies developed and used in richer
countries.
7.2.5 Employment
Some workers are likely to lose their jobs and their incomes
for extended periods under a competitiveness strategy. But
even this may not be as serious as might be imagined. Many
workers in Ukraine are already without income from their
jobs because their enterprises have not been able to pay
wages for months. In fact, their incomes may actually rise.
Freed of the obligation to show up every day to do work for
which they never get paid, they become free to find other use-
ful employment. Even if this time were only used to grow food
for subsistence and small trading, the worker may come out
ahead even in the short term.
In the longer term, if the government creates a good business
and investment climate, renewed economic growth will gen-
erate new employment opportunities for most able-bodied
workers.
However, one issue that the government would have to face in
the transition to a competitiveness strategy is skills mismatch.
While renewed economic growth will eventually create new
jobs, many workers may lack the skills needed to work in the
new environment. Ukraine may find itself left with a relatively
high unemployment rate even after several years of solid eco-
nomic growth.
Dealing with this problem by continuing to subsidize ineffi-
cient industries is very costly and perpetuates the problem.
Perhaps the best approach the government can take is to in-
vest in training strategies to equip workers with the skills de-
manded by Ukraines productive enterprises. At the least, the
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Government needs to ensure that it provides adequate in-
come support and job placement services to the unemployed.
The Polish Therapy
Poland is an example of a country that has chosen the competitiveness strategy. Over 1990 and
1991 Poland opened up its economy to foreign competition, liberalised prices, restructured enter-
prises, and rapidly privatised a number of small and medium sized businesses.
 The so-called Balcerowicz-Sachs shock therapy initially hit the Polish economy hard. The ther-
apy brought Poland two-digit unemployment rates and sharp declines in gross domestic product
(GDP) and industrial output. By 1992 GDP was almost 18% lower than it was before the re-
forms in 1989.
However, the Polish economy returned to growth in 1993 and by the end of 1996 had more than
made up the ground lost during the early 1990s. By the end of 1998 economic activity is esti-
mated to be 17% higher than in 1989.
The transition has hit some groups in Poland hard. In particular, the transition to market prices
has been reflected in significant falls in agricultural prices and farmers incomes. Workers also
saw large falls in the purchasing power of their wages. Inflation-adjusted wages have been in-
creasing since 1993 but, due to large falls in the early 1990s, are still lower than in 1989. How-
ever, this largely reflects high inflation in the early 1990s as artificially low prices increased to
market rates. This fall in purchasing power is deceptive. While in theory real incomes of workers
were higher in 1989, in reality shortages meant that it was often not possible to exchange that
income for goods and services.
The recent crisis in Russia has curbed prospects for economic growth over 1999. Falling demand
for Polish exports has taken some steam out of economic growth and will put upward pressure on
Polands current account deficit. However, Poland has found itself in a relativity strong position
to cope with this crisis. Foreign confidence in Poland has been reflected in continued growth in
foreign direct investment and protected the zloty from speculative pressure. The secure zloty has
allowed Polands monetary council to cut interest rates in response to the slowing economy and
weakening inflation. Lower interest rates should help stimulate domestic demand and help prop
up growth rates towards the end of 1999.
Poland can not emerge unscathed from a slowing world economy. But it is no coincidence that
former soviet union countries which have moved towards a competitiveness strategy, like Poland
and the Baltic States, have been hit less hard than those who continue to implement a mixture of
the preservation and protectionist strategies.
7.2.6 Distribution of Income
The previous discussion highlights that there will be equity
implications from the competitiveness strategy. The changes
would create losers as well as winners. Some banks and enter-
prises would have to go through restructuring and possible
liquidation, and this will hurt those who lose their jobs be-
cause of the restructuring or closure. However, as noted
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above, the real reduction of income in these cases may be
relatively modest because of the widespread non-payment of
wages in such enterprises. Some may also be successful in
finding new job opportunities in the more competitive envi-
ronment.
More generally, the increased investment, efficiency and out-
put that would come with a competitiveness strategy would
lead to higher incomes and standards of living for Ukrainian
people. While not all people will succeed in the new envi-
ronment, benefits are likely to be more broadly spread than
under a preservation or protectionist strategy. Under these
two strategies, vested interests tend to secure a large share of
the shrinking wealth of the country.
For those who are not be able to benefit in the short run from
the transition process, the Government would need to pro-
vide a good social safety net. It could also reduce the social
transition costs by providing support for small enterprise de-
velopment, education and training to improve employment
prospects and improved health care facilities.
The real standard of living of all people, including those tem-
porarily without jobs, could be further enhanced by provid-
ing improved municipal infrastructure, especially in poor
neighbourhoods of cities and in rural areas, including clean
water, access to sanitation, clean markets, reliable electricity
supplies, public telephones, and more reliable public trans-
port.
This type of government support would put upward pressure
on expenditure. But it could be at least partly offset by the
reduced cost of subsidies and tax exemptions. International
organisations are also likely to be willing to help bear these
transition costs. If the municipalities, ideally with incremental
financial help from the national government, were to step in
and provide access to social services, the workers real in-
comes may change very little with the closing of bankrupt en-
terprises.
7.3 Summary
The competitiveness strategy is not without its costs. Exposing
inefficient enterprises to competition will have immediate
negative implications for production levels and employment.
As such, the costs of the strategy would fall most heavily on
those individuals who lost their jobs and this is a key reason
why Ukrainian decision-makers have been slow to adopt ele-
There will be equity impli-
cations from the competi-
tiveness strategy. The
changes would create
losers as well as winners.
However, the increased
investment, efficiency
and output that would
come with a competitive-
ness strategy would lead
to higher incomes and
standards of living for
Ukrainian people.
Economic Growth with Equity: Which Strategy for Ukraine?
Policy Studies, March 1999 57
ments of this strategy. However, the benefits of the competi-
tiveness strategy appear to outweigh the costs. Competitive
pressures will force the efficient use of Ukraines resources,
the key determinant of future living standards. This suggests
that there are more effective ways of protecting the incomes
of workers than subsidizing their employers.
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8. Facing the Challenge
We recommend that the Ukrainian Government adopt the competitiveness
strategy. It provides the best opportunities to make sustainable improvements in
the living standards of the Ukrainian people. This strategy will have some
undesirable outcomes in the short term. But to achieve its objectives the
Government needs to look beyond the immediate future. It is crucial that
government officials and politicians re-focus decision-making processes away
from the short term and towards a more strategic model of government.
kraine faces the challenge of creating sustainable growth
with equity. These objectives can not be achieved easily.
To rise to the challenge Ukraine must create a national con-
sensus on a strategy for both economic and social policy. If
Ukraines policies react to short term crises on an ad hoc ba-
sis, the country will continue to stumble from one crisis to
another. Problems such as wage and pension arrears and bar-
ter need to be addressed. But they must be addressed in the
context of a longer-term strategy. If the government lurches
from one individual problem to another, it will lose grasp on
its overarching objectives.
In all countries, economic and social problems and policies
are inter-related. We can not deal with these problems se-
quentially or separately. Ukraine can not work on the prob-
lem of arrears, then turn its attention to falls in production.
With that approach, the solution to todays problems creates
tomorrows problems. For example, experience over the last
few years shows that whenever the government focused on the
budget wage and pension arrears, it responded with policies
designed to extract more cash from enterprises. This typically
had the effect of putting the brakes on business activity. After
some time, the government would refocus on falling output,
moving to support enterprises and reduce taxation, leading
in turn to the resurgence of the arrears crisis4.
This report recommends a strategy ¾ the competitiveness
strategy. Of the three strategies outlined here, the competi-
                                                                
4 Alex Sundakov, Transition Crisis: Is Crisis Management Delaying
Transition?, New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, Paper
presented to the German-Ukrainian Symposium: Ukraine finding
its way to a market economy  lessons from an international
comparison, 19/20 June 1998.
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tiveness strategy clearly has the greatest potential to deliver
sustainable improvements in the living standards of Ukrain-
ian people. Under this strategy, the role of government
changes from the ownership and control of production to
providing a stable environment for business where all enter-
prises have equal access to critical inputs and markets. It in-
cludes measures such as removing protection of favoured en-
terprises, deregulation, continued privatisation and provid-
ing a transparent and predictable legal framework.
The strategy does not involve government leaving all Ukraini-
ans to live or die at the whim of the market. While we have
argued that the market is usually more effective than govern-
ment at allocating resources, there are situations where mar-
kets do not work well. The market is even less able to ensure
that economic prosperity is distributed fairly. The extent to
which Ukraine seeks to redistribute income is, at least partly,
a political decision. However, it should see itself as a protector
of people, not of production. It should also seek to protect
people in ways that minimise the economic cost to other
Ukrainians. For example, paying direct benefits to pensioners
is a much less costly and more effective way to protect
Ukraines grandparents than regulating the prices of goods
and services.
The details of how to implement this strategy are not dis-
cussed in this report. Instead they are addressed in the second
volume of the CEM. These reports should be read in conjunc-
tion. Of course, policy makers need not only a strategy, they
also need a detailed guide as to how to put that strategy into
practice. We can not separate the short and long-term in pol-
icy making: instead we have to take small steps towards our
long-term goals.
Sometimes taking steps towards our long-term goals will ini-
tially have undesirable impacts. To adopt the competitiveness
strategy, government would have to take a conscious decision
to accept some short-term costs in return for placing Ukraine
on a path towards higher living standards. Government fo-
cused only on immediate solutions to Ukraines problems
sees the steps needed to take the transition to a more market-
based economy as part of the problem rather than part of the
solution. Deregulation, for example, tends to have negative
fiscal consequences in the short term. Allowing bankruptcies
will have an immediate impact on unemployment. However,
ways of lessening these impacts without sacrificing our longer-
term goals can be identified (see companion volumes).
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It is often difficult for policy makers to focus on longer-term
objectives when they are being buffeted by the problems of
the day. The temptation is to find an immediate solution that
will make the symptoms of the problem go away but this rarely
fixes the underlying problems. Knowing their understandable
tendency to focus on the short term, Ukraines decision-
makers should commit themselves to their own medium-term
strategy. For example, Cabinet of Ministers could impose a
rule on itself that it will not consider any proposals unless they
are accompanied by a report explaining how they fit within its
overall long-term strategy, and how they will interact with
other policies.
In many countries, the professional civil service acts as a
counter-balance to the short time horizons of the political
process. Unfortunately, this function is not being performed
by the government agencies in Ukraine. Delays in undertak-
ing administrative reform have meant that the civil service is
not set up to provide medium-term strategic advice to the
government. Instead it too is focused on the short-term.
Therefore, for any strategy to be implemented successfully,
administrative reform is crucial. The main objective of this
reform should be to re-focus decision-making processes away
from the short term, and towards a more strategic model of
government. Government officials need to become account-
able for pursuing activities which are not consistent with the
governments policy objectives. Technical assistance also
needs to be focused towards providing public servants with
the skills needed to help policy-makers make good decisions.
If Ukraine does not make the effort to look beyond the im-
mediate future, its economy will continue to stagnate or drop
further. The competitiveness strategy would ultimately re-
verse the cruel decline in incomes since 1990. It would allow
Ukraine to move steadily closer to the goal, shared by most, of
becoming a modern, self-sufficient, and even modestly pros-
perous member of the European Community. No unsolvable
physical problems stand in the way. Ukraine has the natural
resources, the educated people, and the work ethic that are
needed. It simply needs the commitment to move forward on
a sustainable growth path as rapidly as possible.
